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Abstract
A significant minority of jurisdictions in the United States
offer extreme emotional disturbance (EED) as a partial
defense to murder. The form of this defense, as established
by statute and case law, varies widely among jurisdictions.
Empirical research on EED is scant with little guidance to
forensic mental health professionals on how to approach
and conceptualize potential EED cases. This paper addresses
these issues by being the first known published work to (1)
set forth a contemporary map of the varying definitions and
scope of EED across the United States, (2) translate legal
terminology into constructs accessible to forensic evaluators, and (3) provide legal and clinical analyses of sample EED
cases to highlight key differences in the form of the defense
and the admissibility of evidence between jurisdictions.
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In July 2021, Ian Kazer of Long Island, New York, was sentenced to several years in prison after killing his mother in
a reported fit of rage (Chasan, 2021). By all accounts, Kazer, who was diagnosed with autism and attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder as a youth, struggled with controlling his emotions and behavior. At 31 years old, he still lived
with his parents due to chronic instability. In the weeks leading up to his mother's murder, Kazer was fired from a
retail position for stealing, which created increasing conflict with his parents. In 2019 during an argument in which his
parents reportedly suggested he move out and stated his “life was over,” Kazer snapped, brutally stabbing his mother
47 times and attempting to kill his father, who was stabbed once in the chest but managed to escape (Murphy, 2021).
During legal proceedings, Kazer's attorney claimed his client was under the influence of “extreme emotional disturbance” (EED), the nature of which made it extremely difficult to control his behavior in the face of perceived threats.
Behav Sci Law. 2022;40:733–755.
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After deliberation, the jury found Kazer guilty not of first-degree murder, but of manslaughter, attempted murder,
assault, and grand larceny. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison—a punishment reflective of the court's belief that,
were it not for the magnitude of his emotional response, he would not have harmed others.
Kazer's case is illustrative of the complex and often headline-grabbing nature of cases involving EED, or intentional homicides following provocation or an unusual stressor that allegedly overwhelmed the defendant's reason
and resulted in a loss of behavioral control. This partial excuse originated with the Model Penal Code (MPC), but
the few states that have adopted it differ in their application of the defense, including the permitted role of mental
disorder and the degree the defense deviates from the traditional heat-of-passion defense. This article seeks to
be the first to explore the differing state approaches to EED defenses, and discuss relevant case law for additional
context. Furthermore, unlike the majority of the available EED literature, this article serves to provide guidance on
the appropriate role of mental health experts in these cases, and practical suggestions for conceptualizations of EED
within forensic evaluation.

1 | THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed EED as a partial defense to murder (MPC Proposed Official
Draft, 1962, p. 126). MPC § 210.3(1)(b) provides for the mitigation of murder to manslaughter when:
[A] homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be (MPC and Commentaries, p. 43).
The ALI intended EED to be a substantial expansion of the common law partial defense of heat of passion (HOP)
(MPC and Commentaries, 49). As such, the provision holistically recognizes the diminished culpability of a person
whose intentional killing was impelled by overwhelming mental or emotional stress. It eliminated “rigid” limitations in
the traditional defense, including the “arbitrary exclusion of some circumstances” from “adequate provocation,” the
requirement that the victim be the provoking agent, and the necessity that the killing soon follow the provoking event
(MPC and Commentaries, p. 61).
The ALI dictated that the trier of fact assess the reasonableness of the excuse for the disturbance from the
actor's perspective, in this way softening “the rigorous objectivity” of the common law (MPC and Commentaries, pp. 61–62). Assessment should include the defendant's “personal handicaps and some external circumstances”
like “blindness, shock from traumatic injury, and extreme grief,” while excluding any idiosyncratic moral values (MPC
and Commentaries, p. 62). 1 Courts retain discretion over whether to permit consideration of other characteristics less
clearly associated with diminished blameworthiness, such as extreme sensitivity to insults or “an abnormally fearful
temperament” (MPC and Commentaries, pp. 62–63).
The ALI noted that EED's emphasis on the actor's subjective mental state could allow for inquiry into areas traditionally associated with responsibility (MPC and Commentaries, p. 54). The MPC's defense may thus be conceptualized as offering two bases for mitigation: (1) the emotional disturbance prong, which significantly enlarges common
law HOP, and (2) the extreme mental disturbance prong, a form of a partial responsibility defense that recognizes
mental impairment short of insanity (Buchhandler-Raphael, 2020). 2
Eleven states currently include EED-like provisions in their criminal codes. 3 All but three of these jurisdictions (Hawaii, Montana, and New Hampshire) omit the term “mental” in the MPC's suggested “extreme mental and
emotional disturbance” standard in favor of simply “extreme emotional disturbance,” typically to distance EED from
responsibility defenses (State v. Counts, 1991). In addition, states diverge in which features of common law HOP
they retain and the extent to which they consider mental disorder in the EED analysis. The following sections identify
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varying definitions of EED, explore the preservation of HOP limitations, and discuss the admissibility and sufficiency
of various types of evidence in EED cases.

2 | DEFINITIONS OF EED
The most prevalent definition of EED among the states derives from People v. Shelton (1976). There, the New York
court defined the affirmative mitigating defense of EED as applying to a person who 4
(a)	has no mental disease or defect that rises to the level [of insanity]; and
(b)	is exposed to an extremely unusual and overwhelming stress; and
(c)	has an extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which there is a loss of self-control and reason is overborne
by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions (p. 717).
The Shelton court stressed the “key factor” of loss of self-control and the importance of the time interval between
the provocation and the act (pp. 717–718). The main components of the Shelton definition have been adopted in
Connecticut (State v. Elliott, 1979), Hawaii (State v. Perez, 1999), 5 Oregon (State v. Ott, 1984), and North Dakota (State
v. Trieb, 1982). Other jurisdictions, such as Kentucky (McClellan v. Commonwealth, 1986), employ a similar definition
but specify that EED is a temporary State of mind and cannot merely reflect the effects of mental illness.
States also differ in their approach to defining the term “extreme” for the jury. Connecticut defines the term
restrictively as “the greatest degree of intensity away from the norm for that individual” (State v. Elliott, 1979, p. 10).
In State v. Crespo (1998), the state supreme court considered a killing which occurred during a fight between the
defendant and his girlfriend and found the trial court could have reasonably concluded the disturbance did not meet
that standard because “[c]ircumstances were not significantly different from those surrounding any. . . prior fights”
(p. 934). 6 Other states, such as Oregon, have chosen not to replicate Connecticut's definition of “extreme” (State v.
Ott, 1984). Some jurisdictions forgo defining EED for the jury at all, instead leaving the issue to the jury's common
understanding of the phrase (Ross v. State, 1984; State v. Haili, 2003).

3 | ABOLITION OF COMMON LAW LIMITATIONS
Although EED was proposed as an alternative to the common law HOP defense, most states retain some common
law features. 7 To qualify for the traditional HOP defense, a defendant typically must show:
(1) adequate provocation; (2) a passion or emotion such as fear, terror, anger, rage or resentment;
(3) [the] homicide occurred while the passion still existed and before a reasonable opportunity for the
passion to cool; and (4) a causal connection between the provocation, passion[,] and homicide (Tryon
v. State, 2018, p. 638).
Moreover, the test for adequate provocation is objective, calling for assessment from the perspective of an “ordinary person of average disposition” (People v. Beltran, 2013, p. 1129) and “preclud[ing] consideration of the innate
peculiarities of the individual defendant” (State v. Molina, 2014, p. 1152). While many EED jurisdictions have substantially broadened these stipulations, most preserve certain limitations, as reflected in Table 1. Indeed, a handful of
EED states retain so many common law HOP elements that, in practice, they are nearly indistinguishable from their
ancestors. 8
As under HOP, a majority of EED states require a provoking event to trigger the emotional disturbance (e.g.,
Foster v. Commonwealth, 1991; State v. MacGregor, 2013; Murder, N.D., 2020). Many states specify that provocation
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Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; does not
permit consideration of mental
disorder in any part of EED test
(Bankston v. State, 2005; Kail v.
State, 2000)

Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; permits
evidence of mental disorder not
rising to the level of insanity to
demonstrate presence of EED
(State v. Elliott, 1979); defendant
must establish their emotional
disturbance was not a mental disease
or defect that rose to the level of
insanity (Connecticut Criminal Jury
Instructions, 2020; Blue, 1990)

Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance, but allows
mental disorder not rising to the level
of insanity to support EED defense,
including adjustment disorder (State
v. Magner, 1997)

Defense extends to extreme mental
or emotional disturbance; permits
mental disorder not rising to the level
of insanity to demonstrate presence
of EED (State v. Perez, 1999),
including personality disorders (State
v. Dumlao, 1986)

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Treats evidence of mental illness as
probative

Hybrid to some degree

Hybrid

Hybrid

Hybrid to some degree
(Manslaughter, 2020a)

Hybrid or objective
reasonable standard

Summary of key characteristics of states' EED provisions

Appears to reject (State v.
Espiritu, 2008)

Retains (Moore v.
State, 1983)

Rejects (State v. Elliott, 1979)

Retains (Kail v. State, 2000);
provocation can only be
met through physical
fighting, a threat or
brandished weapon
(Bankston v. State, 2005)

Provoking event

Traditional HOP requirements
Insufficient cooling time

Rejects (State v.
Dumlao, 1986)

Rejects (Boyd v. State, 1978)

Rejects (State v. Elliott, 1979)

Retains (Kail v. State, 2000)

Provocation by victim

Rejects (State v. Russo,
1987)

Retains (Extreme
Emotional
Distress, 2020)

Rejects (State v. Kaddah,
1999)

Retains (MacKool v. State,
2005)
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Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; evidence
of mental illness will not suffice
to establish EED, but it can be
relevant to subjective prong of
reasonableness test (McClellan v.
Commonwealth, 1986)

Defense extends to extreme mental or
emotional disturbance; evidence of
serious mental illness can contribute
to EED (State v. Scarborough, 2000)

Defense extends to extreme mental or
emotional disturbance; appears to
permit evidence of mental illness
to support EED defense (battered
spouse syndrome, State v. Briand,
1988)

Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; permits
evidence of mental disorder not
establishing insanity to contribute
to both prongs of EED test (People v.
Shelton, 1976; People v. Moye, 1985;
People v. Young, 1985)

Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; permits
evidence of mental disorder not rising
to the level of insanity to support
EED defense (State v. Trieb, 1982)

Montana

New Hampshire

New York

North Dakota

Treats evidence of mental illness as
probative

(Continued)

Hybrid

Hybrid

Objective (State v.
Smith, 1983)

Hybrid to some degree

Hybrid (Fields v.
Commonwealth, 2001)

Hybrid or objective
reasonable standard

Retains (Murder, 2020)

Rejects (People v.
Patterson, 1976)

Retains (Manslaughter,
2020)

Retains (State v.
MacGregor, 2013)

Retains (Foster v.
Commonwealth, 1991)

Provoking event

Traditional HOP requirements
Insufficient cooling time

Retains to some degree
(State v. Kirkpatrick,
2012)

Rejects (People v.
Patterson, 1976)

Retains (State v. Soto, 2011)

Rejects (Hans v. State, 1997)

Retains (Fields v.
Commonwealth, 2001)

Provocation by victim

(Continues)

Rejects (State v. Huber,
1985)

Rejects (Patterson v. New
York, 1977, dissent)

Retains (State v.
Smith, 1983)

Uncertain

Rejects (Gall v.
Commonwealth, 1980)
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Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; evidence
of mental illness cannot be used to
establish EED (SMMI, 2020) or to
determine whether the explanation
or excuse for the disturbance is
reasonable (State v. Bishop, 1988)

Utah

Objective (SMMI, 2020)

Hybrid to some degree

Hybrid or objective
reasonable standard

Retains (SMMI, 2020)

Rejects (State v. Corbin,
1973)

Provoking event

Traditional HOP requirements
Insufficient cooling time

Retains (SMMI, 2020)

Rejects (State v. Ott, 1984)

Provocation by victim

Retains (SMMI, 2020)

Rejects
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Note: The case law in Guam and American Samoa was too limited to include in this table.

Restricts defense to extreme emotional
(not mental) disturbance; permits
evidence of mental disorder not
rising to the level of insanity, but
not personality disorder, to support
both prongs of EED (State v.
Zielinski, 2017; State v. Ott, 1984)

Treats evidence of mental illness as
probative

(Continued)

Oregon

State

TA B L E 1
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cannot be “comprised of words alone” 9 (e.g., SMMI, 2020), but instead must consist of highly provoking conduct by
the victim or a reasonable belief of the same (e.g., Extreme Emotional Distress, 2020). For instance, Arkansas limits
adequate provocation to “physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon” (Spann v. State, 1997, p. 540). Some
states even require that the victim's conduct have been unlawful (State v. Smith, 1983). However, the provocation
requirement of other EED states is less demanding than under the common law. For example, Delaware holds that
provoking events merely must be external to the accused and not attributable to them (Moore v. State, 1983). In addition, Kentucky maintains that any event, even words, may evoke EED (Gall v. Commonwealth, 1980).
About half of EED jurisdictions follow the common law approach in requiring “uninterrupted” provocation,
mandating there be insufficient time between the provocation and the killing for the defendant's emotions to cool
(Fields v. Commonwealth, 2001, p. 359). The remainder, like the MPC, reject the “cooling time” limitation. For instance,
New York has recognized that under EED “significant mental trauma [may affect] a defendant's mind for a substantial
period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming to the fore” (People v. Patterson, 1976, p. 908). Similarly, Connecticut has found a killing under EED may be “brought about by a significant mental
trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without
provocation” (State v. Elliott, 1979, p. 7).
Finally, some states have weakened the subjective aspect of the “reasonable person” test. Most EED states follow
the MPC in directing that the reasonableness of the explanation for a disturbance be evaluated from the perspective
of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances that they perceived at the time (People v. Casassa, 1980;
State v. Ortiz, 1991; State v. Dumlao, 1986; State v. Magner, 1997). However, other states have made the test more
objective. For instance, Oregon's EED statute requires that reasonableness “be determined from the standpoint of
an ordinary person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believed them to be”
(Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 2020). At least two states, Utah and New Hampshire, employ a completely objective standard (State v. Bishop, 1988; State v. Smith, 1983).

4 | ADMISSIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE IN EED CASES
Defendants typically support their EED claims with forensic mental health testimony (People v. Shelton, 1976; People
v. Moye, 1985). 10 Notably, such testimony need not pertain to a mental health condition but rather can be used to
establish the defendant's overwhelming emotion or loss of self-control (State v. Elliott, 1979). The below subsections discuss the importance of various categories of evidence, including mental disorder, intoxication and substance
abuse, and loss of self-control.

4.1 | Mental disorder
Table 1 summarizes the extent to which evidence of mental illness may be probative to an EED claim. Although
only Hawaii, Montana, and New Hampshire explicitly permit a defense for a “mental disturbance” without extreme
emotional effects, several other states permit mental disorder to help establish the presence of an extreme emotional
disturbance or to support the reasonableness of the explanation for that disturbance.
Some states permit mental disorder to contribute to both prongs of the EED standard, no matter how severe the
mental illness appears to be. 11 For example, in New York “[a] defendant cannot establish an extreme emotional disturbance defense without evidence that [they] suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity at the
time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-control” (People v. Roche, 2002, p. 1138). Crucially, a “mental
infirmity” need not be a psychiatric disorder, and forensic mental health testimony is not necessary to establish EED
(People v. McKenzie, 2012). Instead, mental infirmity “refers more broadly to any reasonably explicable emotional
disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control” and may be inferred from the defendant's

10990798, 2022, 6, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bsl.2580 by University Of Florida, Wiley Online Library on [04/12/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

JOHNSTON et al.

behavior. Although the mental infirmity must “not ris[e] to the level of insanity” (People v. Roche, 2002, p. 1138),
this condition appears merely to acknowledge the reality that, if a defendant is insane, they should be acquitted
(Blue, 1990; N.Y. Crim, 2016) (not including this element). 12
Even when mental disorder rising to the level of insanity cannot support an EED defense, “lesser mental infirmities” may still be considered. For instance, an Oregon appellate court in State v. Zielinski (2017) treated “lesser mental
infirmity” such as anxiety disorder as a “personal characteristic” (like gender, sexual orientation, pregnancy, and physical disability) that should factor into an “actor's situation” in the reasonableness prong of the EED test (pp. 977–980).
It reasoned that lesser mental disorders “may be the focus of clinical attention[,]. . . can involve acute symptoms
and. . . [are] susceptible to psychological and medical treatment” so more closely resemble physical disability than
“nonclinical personality traits” like ill temperament or stubbornness (p. 978). However, Zielinski (2017) prohibited
consideration of any mental illness that “intertwined” with the actor's “personality characteristics” such as a personality disorder (pp. 977–978). Other Shelton states may permit personality disorders to support an EED claim, however
(State v. Dumlao, 1986; Linnen v. Poole, 2001, noting New York courts have “not fixed with precision the contours of
what constitutes a ‘mental infirmity’”).
Jurisdictions that require an external provoking event to establish EED vary as to whether they factor mental
disorder into the reasonableness of the defendant's excuse for their disturbance. Kentucky and Delaware consider
such evidence probative to the reasonableness assessment (Fields v. Commonwealth, 2001; State v. Magner, 1997).
However, a few states appear to prohibit consideration of mental disorder in EED cases altogether. The Arkansas
Supreme Court made clear that mental disorder should not factor into the assessment of an event's provoking nature
(Kail v. State, 2000), the actor's “situation,” or the “circumstances” the actor believed to exist at the time of the offense
(Bankston v. State, 2005). Similarly, Utah's EED statute appears largely, if not completely, to exclude consideration of
a defendant's mental disorder (SMMI, 2020).

4.2 | Intoxication and substance abuse
States diverge in their treatment of intoxication and substance abuse in relation to EED. Some states, such as Delaware and New York, hold such evidence inadmissible (Extreme Emotional Distress, 2020; People v. Knights, 1985).
Other states permit evidence of intoxication or substance abuse to support an EED defense, although such evidence
alone typically will not suffice to establish EED. For example, the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Miller (1998)
relied on the defendant's high level of intoxication, which “impaired his judgment and reasoning,” when upholding his conviction of mitigated murder (p. 728). The court stressed, however, that the conviction was only justified
“because there existed other mitigating circumstances besides Appellant's intoxication and fear of being assaulted”
(p. 728). North Dakota and Hawaii treat mental conditions caused by substance abuse in a similar manner (“acute
alcohol intoxication, a psychosis with drug intoxication,” State v. Trieb, 1982; substance-induced psychosis, State v.
Young, 2000).

4.3 | Loss of self-control
Loss of self-control is a common, and often predominant, requirement of EED standards (Buchhandler-Raphael, 2020;
State v. Matias, 1992). Psychiatric evidence may be used to establish this crucial element (People v. Harris, 2000). 13
Importantly, evidence of a violent killing will not suffice to establish EED if other evidence suggests the defendant
maintained self-control at the time of the killing. For example, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Roche (2002)
found evidence that Roche had stabbed his girlfriend 12 to 14 times in a violent struggle insufficient to warrant an
EED charge given conduct indicating possession of self-control, including telling neighbors that the victim committed suicide, changing his socks, and gathering items in a duffle bag to prevent discovery (p. 1139; see also State v.
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Jusino (2016); State v. Buckley, 1976). EED cases often turn on the presence and credibility of evidence indicating a
loss of self-control, whether in the form of psychiatric testimony or from the defendant's statements and conduct.

5 | CONSIDERATIONS FOR FORENSIC EVALUATORS
Considering the complex legal backdrop, there is much a mental health expert must consider when approached
to evaluate a defendant pursuing an EED defense. Importantly, experts must be familiar with the legal standard
in their jurisdiction, as the scope of their role will be impacted by the extent to which the court considers mental
health evidence relevant to momentary stressors. In states that have adopted the MPC's reasonableness standard,
evaluators may be asked to opine on “the subjective, internal situation in which the defendant found himself and the
external circumstances as he perceived them at the time [of the homicide], however inaccurate that perception may
have been” (People v. Casassa, 1980, p.1316). In addition, evaluators would be expected to discuss the origin of and
contributing factors to the EED as well as the causal link between the EED and the criminal act in question. However,
in some jurisdictions, mental health experts may only be asked to evaluate an EED defendant if the emotional disturbance is suspected to arise from some type of mental condition or abnormality that is “beyond the ken” of the average
layperson (Goldstein et al., 2013, p. 448).
Given the similarities among legal standards—and to reduce the degree of subjectivity often present in EED
evaluations—evaluators typically should describe how the defendant's decision-making, lack of self-control, intensity
of feeling, impaired reasoning ability, and/or mental health symptoms may have affected their behavior or judgment
with consideration given to the relevancy assigned to each factor by the evaluator's jurisdiction. Considering the difficulty of making sense of sometimes multiple, co-occurring, and interacting variables on a defendant's mental state
at the time of the offense, mental health experts are uniquely equipped to provide the trier of fact with information
necessary for a well-informed decision regarding EED. The following sections present important considerations for
evaluators as they prepare for, undertake, and write reports for EED cases: the research backdrop and historical
context of EED evaluations and the evaluative process itself, including consideration of mental illness, substance use,
and self-control.

5.1 | Research on EED evaluations
Importantly, research regarding the role of the mental health evaluator in EED cases is scant and dated. The first
decision model was offered by Goldstein (1989) in the wake of several New York EED cases and emphasized four
stages for evaluators to consider: 1) provocation, whether “simmering” over time or immediate; 2) sudden, intense,
extreme, and uncontrollable emotion; 3) loss of intellectual or emotional control; and 4) a sudden, extreme outburst of
violence. The general thrust of this model was echoed by Hall (1990) and revisited in a later work by Hall et al. (2001).
Hall’s model focused on the defendant's capacity for self-control, with abilities ranging from “disorganized to highly
competent” (Hall, 1990, p. 39), while emphasizing the link between extreme emotion, loss of self-control, and the
criminal act. In addition, Hall highlighted the importance of basing one's conclusions on the defendant's history and
behavior, rather than attempting to assess a defendant's cognitive and emotional state alone (a difficult task that
many legal scholars believe is impossible; see Slobogin, 2006).
In 2001, Hall and colleagues expounded on this model by encouraging evaluators to analyze capacity for self-control before and after—not only during—the offenses. This updated model also proposed evaluators use the following
funneling approach in their analysis: 1) the presence of a significant environmental stressor; 2) a significant, negative
change in the defendant's cognitive and emotional processes; and 3) a loss of self-control (Hall et al., 2001). Later
research highlighted the need to weigh the influence of emotion regulation skills, personality, and other mental health
factors on capacity for self-control, while noting the challenge of determining when loss of self-control is intrinsic to
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mental illness, particularly when a defendant has a diagnosed (or suspected) mental disorder (Drogin & Marin, 2008).
The components of these decision models reflect commonalities in the legal standards discussed above.

5.2 | Evaluative process
After consideration of historical models for EED evaluations, evaluators should prepare for the mental health and
personality pathologies that may be present in EED defendants. To this end, mental health experts should provide
clear and detailed information concerning exactly what elicited the defendant's emotional response, whether that
was the victim's actions, those of some other party, external events or life stressors, or a combination. Evaluators
should also discuss whether the perceived provocation was distant in time from the defendant's actions (i.e., whether
the EED was the result of a gradual build-up or “simmering”), and the extent to which perceived provocation was
fueled by mental illness, trauma, maladaptive personality traits, intoxication, or some other psychologically relevant
construct. Broad consideration of any relevant mental health symptom may be useful to the extent that the symptom
in question influences “extreme emotions” and a resultant behavioral change. 14 A detailed timeline of events should
exist in forensic reports and provide information about the prolonged effects of trauma, substance abuse, etc., over
time.
When preparing for an EED assessment, forensic evaluators might consider starting with a line of inquiry typically associated with criminal responsibility evaluations. Melton et al. (2017, p. 246) provides a useful outline recommending that practitioners address: relevant psychosocial and historical factors; cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
states preceding, during, and after an alleged offense; and hypotheses in a reliable manner by utilizing multiple
sources of data. This information could be garnered and expanded upon as needed via a standard psychosocial
interview focused on the defendant's history, particularly as it relates to emotional and behavioral control. During
the interview, the evaluator should ask the defendant to describe in detail the events leading to their arrest, while
noting any changes in their thinking, emotions, and behavior. Psychological testing could be useful to assess for more
stable conditions likely to affect emotional stability (e.g., personality traits, intelligence, cognitive impairment). Tests
of feigning may assist in determining the extent to which defendants are being honest regarding their symptoms at
the time of the evaluation.
When crafting a final opinion, evaluators must provide the trier of fact with the most accurate information
about a defendant's mental and emotional state while being mindful of the need to leave legal issues to the factfinder. This stance has led some to conclude that any evaluations of mental state at the time of the offense should
convey “the fullest, richest, most textured description possible of the defendant's mental and emotional state”
(Morse, 1984, pp. 51–52; see also; Slobogin, 2006). Moreover, the evaluator must also provide the factfinder with
any information that may assist in the determination of factors relevant to EED: the existence and source of any
emotional or mental disturbance, its nature, and any contributing factors; how the defendant may have experienced
this disturbance (e.g., how they saw the world, their feelings/perceptions, and any impacts on reasoning and/or
self-control); whether this disturbance should be considered “extreme” given the individual's baseline; any relation
between the disturbance and a plausible triggering circumstance; and evidence of the causal connection between the
EED and the homicidal act. To assist evaluators in crafting their language to meet a court's needs, we consider each
of these factors below, with recommendations for both evaluation and report-writing provided.

5.2.1 | Evidence of mental illness or disorder
As previously noted, in considering the potential clinical picture of a defendant who may assert an EED defense, it is
important to learn how the jurisdiction approaches evidence pertaining to mental illness and, therefore, what clinical
presentations may qualify for EED. All EED definitions require a departure from normal (“reasonable”) emotional
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response secondary to an overwhelmingly stressful situation, resulting in intense feelings such as rage and a consequent loss of self-control. Thus, a clinician should focus on the presentation and pattern of symptoms and stress any
evidence indicating a loss of self-control, rather than focus on specific diagnoses, as a court could rule that certain
diagnoses rise to the level of insanity or are “personal characteristics” and thus are not appropriate for a defense
of EED.
Among the wide array of mental health diagnoses that present with difficulties in self-control, the fifth edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Manual Disorders (DSM-5), describes disruptive, impulse-control, and
conduct disorders as unique because they “[manifest] in behaviors that violate the rights of others (e.g., aggression,
destruction of property), and/or. . . bring the individual into significant conflict with societal norms or authority figures”
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 461). Thus, by the very nature of their diagnostic descriptors, interactions
with the legal system appear all but expected. Externalized anger and aggression are also common features among
trauma and stressor-related disorders. While not a dispositive sign of such pathology, individuals with posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) can evidence dysfunction with autonomic arousal and reactive expressions of hostility, baseline negative emotionality, and tendencies to erroneously appraise innocuous situations as something emergent
and harmful (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Indeed, some researchers have concluded the commission
of violent acts by those with trauma exposure is primarily driven by hyperarousal (Barrett et al., 2011). Many problematic personality traits commonly seen in personality disorders may also contribute to acts of violence under the
right circumstances. For example, distrust, suspiciousness, and tendencies to ruminate on and interpret situations
and interactions as hostile or threatening may result in increased hostility toward and from others (Carroll, 2009).
Additional impulsive and potentially aggressive acts may also stem from emotional dyscontrol (Bertsch et al., 2018;
Newhill et al., 2012).

5.2.2 | Substance abuse
Substance use is another important factor to consider when assessing a potentially emotion-fueled act. A clear relationship exists between risk of violence and substance use disorders, especially when coupled with a co-occurring
mental illness (Schifano et al., 2020; Van Dorn et al., 2012). Substance intoxication also tends to have an additive
effect with the symptoms of preexisting mental health conditions. In particular, research demonstrates that alcohol
and cannabis exacerbate the hyperarousal symptoms of PTSD (Barrett et al., 2011), increasing an already present
risk for violence perpetration. Similarly, in a sample of those with intermittent explosive disorder (IED) in Coccaro
et al.’s (2016) study, IED preceded substance use disorders in 80% of their sample and also increased the risk for
impulsive and volatile interpersonal acts toward others. In those with borderline personality disorder, criminal assault
charges were partially related to comorbid substance use (Sansone et al., 2014). The research suggests the cumulative effects of substance use may lead someone who already has a predisposition toward intense emotions and/or
impulsivity to react even more explosively. Thus, even in jurisdictions prohibiting evidence related to substance use, it
may be important for an evaluator to note and perhaps highlight the role of substance use in EED cases, particularly if
the defendant shows symptoms of comorbid mental illness.

5.2.3 | Self-control
At the core of EED evaluations is an analysis of the defendant's ability to choose and exercise control over their
behavior (Hall, 1990). Self-control relies upon the cognitive abilities of our executive functioning system in regulating
our attention, behavior, thoughts, and emotions (i.e., inhibitory control) for overriding a strong internal predisposition
(e.g., unwanted thoughts or memories) or external lure (e.g., temptation), and instead allowing us to engage in more
appropriate behavior (DeLisi et al., 2017; Diamond, 2013).

10990798, 2022, 6, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bsl.2580 by University Of Florida, Wiley Online Library on [04/12/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

JOHNSTON et al.

To illustrate executive functions activated in service of self-control, consider an actor with a long history of verbal
and physical abuse from a partner. Perhaps the actor has felt the urge to respond to verbal abuse with disagreement,
yet recognizes from past experience that such an act may beget threats or acts of physical harm. If the actor notices
their partner is irritable and making passive-aggressive comments, they might rely upon self-awareness to recognize
the dilemma (i.e., whether to engage or walk away), inhibition to restrain the urge to respond and escalate the situation (e.g., express disagreement or give interpersonal feedback that the partner is unlikely to appreciate), selective
attention to direct their focus away from the temptation (e.g., contact a friend for support), working memory to
elicit positive self-talk, and problem-solving to cope with the urge to engage (e.g., call a hotline for intimate partner
violence). Deficits in any one of these areas might contribute to interesting considerations in EED cases, particularly
if a defendant exhibits difficulties across a number of emotional and behavioral domains.
Forensic evaluators may come across a variety of clinical presentations where an individual presents with deficits
or lapses in executive functioning. These may include organic or acquired impairments (e.g., neurodevelopmental
disorder, neurocognitive disorder), psychosis, mood disorder, and/or a personality disorder, to name a few. In such
situations, the task of the evaluator is to differentiate between evaluees whose impulsivity is both internalized and
frequent (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, BPD) and those whose otherwise non-injurious tendencies were overborne by external circumstances (Drogin & Marin, 2008). In other words, evaluators are asked to examine an individual's problem-solving style, with attention to executive functions that underlie self-regulation, and assess whether
their response to the stressor in the alleged offense was characteristic of them (due to normative or pathological
personality tendencies) or aberrant. This requires a firm foundation in psychological assessment and conceptualization for understanding the evaluee's patterns of thinking, feeling, and behavior when interacting with their environment, and also consideration of contextual influences on their reaction at the time of the alleged offense. Returning
to our earlier discussion of EED decision models, Hall et al.’s (2001) model offers a particular benefit here, as he and
his colleagues recommend consideration of the impact of situational and intrapsychic factors on self-control and
choice of behaviors.
With respect to the issue of self-control, the following inquiries proposed by Hall (1990) may be useful to
consider in formulating questions and/or conceptualization of the person. First, compare the individual's degree
of self-control at the time of the alleged offense with their own normal behavior. Second, evaluate them against
normative data (e.g., of executive functioning abilities and/or developmentally expected levels) from groups of which
the defendant is a member. Third, analyze any past instances of violence by the evaluee for degree of self-control in
such situations (e.g., a low level of self-regulation may be suggested by the similarity of defendant's actions in other
instances). Fourth, elicit whether the evaluee had a clear rationale for their behaviors, as an absence of such might
indicate a loss of self-control. Intact executive functioning is incompatible with loss of self-control due to extreme
emotion, and evaluators should look for signs where either or both capacities may be compromised (see Table 2 for
factors identified by Hall et al., 2001).
Additionally, psychological research has identified factors that may aggravate failures in impulse control or
executive functioning. For example, the deleterious effects of stress (Arnsten, 1998; Liston et al., 2009; Oaten &
Cheng, 2005), loneliness (Baumeister et al., 2002; Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Campbell et al., 2006; Tun et al., 2013),
and lack of physical health (Hillman et al., 2008) have been found to contribute to negative changes in the prefrontal
cortex (i.e., the part of the brain responsible for executive functioning), and to result in poor reasoning and problem-solving abilities, forgetfulness, and impaired ability to exercise discipline and self-control. Thus, with respect to
EED evaluations, mental health experts must pay attention to the emotional, social, and physical needs of an individual in understanding their cognitive performance and ability to exercise self-control.
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Signs of Intact and compromised executive functioning and/or self-control

Compromised

Intact

● Disorganized behaviors

● Preparation for the violence to follow

● Non-goal-directed hyperactivity (e.g., scattered, random,
non-functional movements)

● Rehearsal of the violent act

● Startle reactions

● Deceiving the victim to take advantage of them
(e.g., giving false information to gain an advantage,
concealing a weapon)

● Immediate responses

● Orchestration of multi-task schemes

● Uncontrolled crying

● Acts that show cognitive flexibility in responses (e.g.,
use of both a knife and firearm during homicide)

● Resistance to influence when under threat

● Ability to show a “change in principle” (e.g., switching
from killing to theft)

● Mental confusion

● Behaviors that are incompatible with stress (e.g., eating
or drinking during a violent act)

● Disorientation

● Testing the victim (e.g., changing behavior to see the
victim's reaction)

● Amnesia

● Ability to delay responses or resist distractions

● Lack of Deception (e.g., openly telling the victims of an
intent to attack)

● Ability to monitor what they have already done before
resuming violence

● Continued violence that goes past the immediate threat
and point where it is functional (e.g., the defendant
kicked the victim repeatedly after death)

● Ability to regulate the tempo, intensity, and duration of
behaviors (e.g., wake the victim from unconsciousness
to elicit pain)

● Development of PTSD related to the instant offense

● Stopping violence after achieving the intended outcome
● Destruction of evidence during or after the violent act

Note: The following information was taken from Hall et al., 2001, as noted in the reference section.

6 | CASE STUDIES
The following case studies illustrate the complex and myriad ways defendants may present during EED evaluations
and how EED determinations may turn on legal differences between jurisdictions.

6.1 | Case study 1: Mr. Palmer
Mr. Palmer is a 42-year-old African-American man with a lengthy history of bipolar disorder. Mr. Palmer responded
positively to antipsychotic and mood-stabilizing medications and owned a successful contracting business. Aside
from obstructive sleep apnea, which he managed using a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine, Mr.
Palmer did not have major health concerns. However, he would occasionally stop taking his medications due to a
belief they were unnecessary. In such instances, he would appear normal, albeit with periods of irritability and worsened sleep, for several months. Over time these symptoms would worsen until Mr. Palmer would hardly sleep, get
into verbal and physical altercations with others, speak rapidly and illogically, and engage in bizarre, agitated behavior.
One fall, Mr. Palmer developed a viral infection that prevented him from using his CPAP. The consequent
sleep disturbance resulted in psychological decline, such that Mr. Palmer reported feeling irritable, disoriented, and
paranoid. One day, his girlfriend contacted his parents out of concern after Mr. Palmer initiated an argument and
appeared irrationally angry, demanding she leave his home and never return. Mr. Palmer’s girlfriend reported that
Mr. Palmer’s apartment appeared ransacked and in shambles, with several holes punched in the wall by Mr. Palmer in
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the belief there were monitoring devices implanted there. Later that night, police arrived at Mr. Palmer’s home after
reports of a man yelling and throwing rocks at passing cars. Mr. Palmer appeared incensed, screaming unintelligibly
and threatening harm if they came closer. With no obvious trigger, he charged one officer, shoving her to the ground
and punching her repeatedly in the face. He was Tasered multiple times, finally relinquishing his hold on the officer
when several other officers separated them. Mr. Palmer was sedated by emergency responders and began wailing
seconds later, expressing remorse for his actions. The officer sustained a serious head injury which proved fatal, and
Mr. Palmer was charged with murder.
At his arraignment, Mr. Palmer was tearful, rambled incoherently, and seemed not to understand the circumstances leading to his arrest. The judge referred him for a competency evaluation. Mr. Palmer was found incompetent
to proceed and received antipsychotic and mood-stabilizing medications, which quickly improved his functioning.
After being found competent to proceed, Mr. Palmer's legal team considered an insanity defense and sought an
expert evaluation for this issue. However, given that Mr. Palmer's case was in a jurisdiction with a Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity standard limited to incapacity to appreciate wrongfulness, this option was not deemed viable
given the lack of clear evidence suggesting delusional influence over his thinking and behavior. Instead, he asserted
an EED defense, alleging an inability to control his emotional responses at the time of the crime due to uncontrolled
mania.
During the interview, Mr. Palmer remembered little from the night of his arrest but recalled believing he was
being watched. He remembered throwing patio furniture over his fence into his neighbor's yard but could not explain
why. When asked about the holes in his walls, Mr. Palmer shrugged, vaguely recalling his belief that cameras had been
installed there by some unknown entity. He also remembered feeling unreasonably angry about police being on his
property but did not think he lashed out at them due to paranoia. Body camera footage from his arrest supported
the assertion that Mr. Palmer was overcome by emotions and impulsivity borne of mania but showed no evidence of
illogical thinking. Aside from his girlfriend's testimony, no evidence suggested Mr. Palmer was detached from reality.

6.1.1 | Legal analysis
If required for his EED defense, Mr. Palmer would have difficulty satisfying traditional HOP requirements as there was
no unlawful act by the deceased or other provoking event external to the accused. In states not requiring a provoking
event, however, Mr. Palmer may be able to satisfy the subjective prong of his EED defense. The body camera footage
suggests that Mr. Palmer was overcome by emotions and impulsivity due to mania which, combined with witnesses'
accounts of his behavior, would help establish his overwhelming emotion and loss of self-control.
Mr. Palmer's EED defense would fail, however, in states that do not permit consideration of mental illness, since
his emotional response can only be considered reasonable in light of his severe mental disorder. In states that recognize mental disorders, his bipolar disorder may help establish one or both prongs of his EED defense (as in New York).
The prosecution may argue that Mr. Palmer's frequent refusal to take medication exacerbates his mental illness, analogizing that to voluntary intoxication in which he should not be entitled to mitigation (depending on the jurisdiction).
However, as his sleep apnea seems to be the primary cause of his mental health decline in this case, the prosecution's
argument will likely fail unless evidence shows he purposefully did not take his pills around the time of the offense
and should have been aware of the resulting decline and consequent harm he inflicted.
If the jurisdiction includes a volitional prong in its insanity standard, Mr. Palmer may also want to pursue an
insanity defense for his inability, due to serious mental illness, to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
at the time of the killing. If the jurisdiction also disqualifies defendants with a mental disorder rising to the level of
insanity from pursuing an EED defense, then Mr. Palmer could be forced to abandon his EED claim (as in Connecticut). Regardless, Mr. Palmer would likely only prevail on an EED defense in states with broad EED formulations.
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6.2 | Case study 2: Mr. Landon
Mr. Landon is a 23-year-old Caucasian man with a history of emotional and behavioral difficulties. From birth, his
mother described him as “a difficult child,” noting he seemed quick to anger at even the slightest setbacks. In primary
school, his teachers described him as bright and engaged with his schooling but observed significant opposition
toward adults, misbehavior toward other children, and difficulty focusing in class. In high school, his intelligence was
measured in the “very superior” range. However, his behavioral difficulties increased, such that he was frequently
admonished for taunting his peers, being disrespectful to his instructors, and skipping school to use alcohol and marijuana. Mr. Landon eventually dropped out of school in the tenth grade. Afterwards, he failed to maintain employment,
citing difficulty getting along with others. He earned his GED at age 17 before pursuing a career in the marijuana
industry.
After moving to a state with recreational marijuana sales, Mr. Landon began using marijuana and alcohol excessively, isolating himself from others. His friends and family reported that Mr. Landon began expressing strange and
seemingly delusional ideas about war with other nations, alternate realities, and being a reincarnated god. However,
they noted Mr. Landon was also so frequently intoxicated that they could not ascertain the extent to which these
symptoms were related to drug or alcohol use. When Mr. Landon was 22 years old, the police were called to his
apartment during a domestic dispute, during which Mr. Landon threatened to kill the officers if they attempted to
enter his home. Mr. Landon was also in increasing conflict with several family members, who stated he frequently
became so angry and dysregulated that he made extremely violent threats about which he later felt remorseful (e.g.,
telling his stepmother he would slit her throat after she made a joke about his alcohol use, then tearfully apologizing
only minutes later). He began to see a psychiatrist for treatment of extremely variable mood, anxiety, substance use,
difficulty connecting to others, and the strange beliefs noted above. He was prescribed mood-stabilizing, antipsychotic, antidepressant, and sedative medications, which he took as directed. During meetings with his psychiatrist,
Mr. Landon reported decreasing mood disturbance but also violent nightmares.
Days after his last appointment with his psychiatrist, Mr. Landon was involved in a traffic accident when another
driver accidently veered into his lane, striking his vehicle and causing minor damage. Mr. Landon exited his car and
exchanged heated words with the other motorist before returning to his vehicle. However, after observing the other
driver taking a picture of his license plate, Mr. Landon removed a firearm from his glove compartment, shot the
other driver, and fired several rounds at other witnesses who escaped without injury. After clearing his magazine,
Mr. Landon returned to his car, hid his firearm, left the scene, and proceeded to work as scheduled. He worked for
several hours as if nothing was amiss and was pulled over by police on his way home, later being charged with first
degree murder.
During his interviews, Mr. Landon described his childhood similar to that noted above, adding that he always felt
disconnected from and superior to others due to his intellect. He recognized he was often in trouble in his youth for
defiance toward adults but attributed this behavior to others misunderstanding him. He acknowledged his explosive
temper and history of aggressive statements, but asserted he was not a violent person and that his actions on the
day of his arrest were associated with severe dissociation. More specifically, Mr. Landon stated he became so upset
after being struck by the other driver that he “blacked out” and that his arm seemed to act of its own accord as if he
were playing a first-person shooter game. Mr. Landon completed several psychological tests during his evaluation,
including those assessing personality, response style, and dissociation. Across all measures, his report was indicative
of severe difficulties with emotion regulation, substance abuse, disconnection from reality, and aggressive behavior,
but also an attempt to appear more psychologically impaired than he was. Additionally, his test results highlighted
that his reported symptoms were highly improbable and even more pronounced than what might be expected from
an inpatient psychiatric population.
Many statements Mr. Landon made regarding his thinking and behavior were incongruent with witness statements and video footage of him at work, where he was observed working calmly, safely, and effectively with highly
technical mechanical equipment only minutes after the killing. Indeed, witnesses of the shooting remarked that Mr.
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Landon appeared emotionless at the time. At no point did anyone note an apparent disconnect from reality or even
disorientation, casting doubt on Mr. Landon's report of severe dissociation during the shooting.

6.2.1 | Legal analysis
If required, Mr. Landon may struggle to satisfy traditional HOP elements such as provocation and cooling time
requirements. For instance, in states with a strict requirement of adequate provocation, such as Arkansas (physical
fighting, threats, or brandishing a weapon) or New Hampshire (unlawful action by victim), the car accident alone
would likely not qualify, although it may be enough to constitute a triggering event in a less stringent jurisdiction.
Likewise, the amount of time that passed between the car accident and the homicide might be considered sufficient
for emotion to cool in an ordinary person, though juries in states that allow for a gradual build-up of mental trauma
(New York, Connecticut) may find the cooling time requirement satisfied. Further, some states such as Kentucky may
hold the event sufficiently “uninterrupted” to qualify for an EED defense. Alternatively, Mr. Landon could argue that
the taking of the picture was the provoking event. However, while this argument could satisfy a strict cooling time
requirement, it is even less likely than the car accident to qualify as adequate provocation.
Mr. Landon’s long history of explosiveness will detract from his EED defense as some jurisdictions may view the
homicide as an escalation of his preexisting anger issues. Most jurisdictions would not consider the event to be an
“unusual emotional experience or circumstance” that meets the threshold of “extreme” (State v. Crespo, 1998).
Mr. Landon's struggle with dissociation, anxiety, and emotion regulation may support an EED finding in a jurisdiction that allows mental illness to support an EED defense. A jury may be wary of this argument, however, as Mr.
Landon attempted to exaggerate his symptoms. Given his high intellect, he may appear as if he is trying to manipulate the system to receive a mitigated sentence. However, his diagnosis and treatment history support his assertion
of mental illness. Some states may prohibit consideration of any personality disorder (State v. Zielienski, 2017). An
additional point of consideration for the finder of fact is whether dissociation, by nature being an internal state,
can truly be perceived by others, and if so, what the outward cues of dissociation to the degree reported by Mr.
Landon might be.
Mr. Landon's calculated post-crime conduct of hiding the gun and shooting at witnesses to prevent them from
testifying strongly indicates a maintenance of self-control (although shooting at witnesses could be argued as a loss
of self-control due to anger). Further, although it is possible his calm return to work just hours after the homicide
could constitute a “cool down,” it is also possible that jurors might perceive this as a lack of an emotional breakdown
altogether. In addition, the fact that no witnesses thought he appeared disconnected from reality or disoriented
undermines any argument of “derealization.” Mr. Landon's history of substance abuse could support his assertion of a
history of mental illness and social stressors, should the jurisdiction recognize such arguments.

6.3 | Case study 3: Mr. Corazon
Mr. Corazon is a 55-year-old Mexican man who immigrated to the United States at age 30. The need to work long
hours on his family's farm in Mexico prevented Mr. Corazon from attending school, and he ultimately withdrew after
attaining minimal education. Mr. Corazon was married for several years and had five children with his first wife, with
this marriage ending in divorce after his wife left him for another man. He began dating but found it difficult to trust
other women, until he met Ms. Tenille. Mr. Corazon described his relationship with Ms. Tenille as chaotic, noting that
she was “aggressive” and seemed to enjoy hurting him. When he sought treatment for depression stemming from
these relationship difficulties, psychological testing placed Mr. Corazon's intellectual functioning in the “low average
to extremely low” range. However, the psychologist completing this testing highlighted the influence of possible
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cultural, linguistic, and educational factors that may have skewed the results. Aside from this possibility of lower
intellectual functioning, Mr. Corazon's records indicated no mental impairment prior to his arrest.
After several months of increasing conflict, Ms. Tenille reportedly told Mr. Corazon she planned to leave him
for another and taunted him for being “less than a man.” Although her words made him angry, Mr. Corazon also felt
sad and did not want Ms. Tenille to leave. After she retired to the bedroom, he retrieved a crowbar from his toolbox,
struck her in the head, and stabbed her several times. He then slit his own wrists, hoping to die while lying next to
her. After 2 hours of “waiting to die,” Mr. Corazon inexplicably left their apartment, and police found him hiding in the
apartment complex's laundry room with severe lacerations to his wrists that required immediate medical treatment.
After Ms. Tenille's death, he was charged with first degree murder.
During his interview, Mr. Corazon explained that Ms. Tenille frequently humiliated him in front of others, mocking
his sexual functioning to her coworkers. He indicated she seemed distant and more irritable than usual in the month
before her death, which led him to attempt to appease her by providing gifts and being more affectionate. One night,
Ms. Tenille admitted to having an affair, and when Mr. Corazon asked why, Ms. Tenille laughed and replied, “Because
he has bigger balls than you.” Mr. Corazon indicated he became so angry that he “saw nothing,” and, in the next few
seconds, stormed to the garage, grabbed the crowbar, and struck Ms. Tenille in the head. He described partial amnesia for the following events, saying that when he regained full consciousness and saw what he had done, he felt so
depressed that he cut his wrists in an attempted suicide. He reported leaving home because he did not know what to
do and was “dazed,” and explained he hid in the laundry room because he was afraid.
During his interview, Mr. Corazon evidenced some difficulty with his memory and showed symptoms of mild
cognitive impairment potentially related to mild intellectual disability or mild neurocognitive disorder. However, these
deficits did not significantly affect his ability to relate his history, maintain satisfactory employment, or meet his
basic needs around the time of the offenses. Thus, these symptoms did not seem to have affected his ability to make
rational decisions nor indicate Mr. Corazon was necessarily less able to regulate his emotions. Additionally, it is notable that Mr. Corazon had once dealt with an unfaithful partner without significant difficulty and had no prior history
of significant aggression or criminal behavior. Nonetheless, the available records and witness statements corroborated that Mr. Corazon had appeared depressed around the time of Ms. Tenille's death, with one witness remarking
she often heard Ms. Tenille yelling at him through their apartment walls and had heard such yelling within an hour
of her death. Furthermore, witnesses and those who knew Mr. Corazon described him as a typically mild-mannered
man, and many said they would not be surprised if he finally “snapped” after years of living with Ms. Tenille.

6.3.1 | Legal analysis
Mr. Corazon will likely have difficulty presenting a qualifying triggering event of provocation in most states that
require one. In states that allow words to qualify as provocation (Delaware, Kentucky, Oregon), he may be successful in asserting that the confession of infidelity caused his breakdown. If the state allows for a cumulative series of
events to build his mental trauma (such as New York), he may fare better due to the constant abuse and humiliation
he endured through the relationship.
Mr. Corazon’s immediate reaction to the news of infidelity and insult, coupled with his partial amnesia and his
dazed and suicidal post-crime conduct, supports his assertion of a loss of self-control. Further, Mr. Corazon has not
exhibited violent behavior in the past, despite having previously experienced infidelity. Thus, he could likely satisfy
the “extreme” aspect of the EED defense even under Connecticut’s strict definition (see State v. Elliott, 1979), as his
actions display a significant degree of intensity away from his norm.
Mr. Corazon's difficulty with memory and symptoms of mild cognitive impairment (potentially related to mild
intellectual disability or mild neurocognitive disorder) will likely not play a significant role in his EED defense. Given
the mild nature of the impairments, they likely did not affect his ability to make rational decisions or regulate emotions.
Therefore, the impairments do not seem causally related to the homicide and will not have a dispositive impact in the
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case, although they will likely still be considered in states that apply a subjective approach to analyzing the reasonableness of the explanation for the disturbance.

7 | CONCLUSION
As Table 1 demonstrates, EED standards vary widely between states, and various differences may prove dispositive
within a given jurisdiction. Forensic evaluators must keep abreast of the relevant statutory definition of EED and
requirements developed in case law. Perhaps most crucial to evaluators' assessments will be whether a state requires
a provoking event to cause an emotional disturbance, or, alternatively, whether emotional effects stemming from a
mental disorder may suffice. Evaluators should also determine the jurisdiction's stance on the use of mental disorder
to inform the reasonableness assessment, and whether the jurisdiction differentiates between disorders that could
support an insanity defense, lesser mental infirmities, and personality disorders.
As noted above, EED has been the subject of very little recent empirical research. Future work should consider
the evolving landscape of EED cases, with particular attention to defendant and situational characteristics in successful EED defenses. Researchers may also choose to evaluate whether changing perspectives regarding assessment and
treatment of mental illness may affect legal dispositions in EED cases. Finally, in light of recommendations made by
other scholars and by the authors of the current paper pertaining to EED and mental health evaluations, it may be
useful to more closely examine the role of forensic evaluators across jurisdictions in order to refine best practices in
these challenging, yet fascinating, cases.
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EN D NOTE S
1

In permitting sensitivity to the genders of the offender and victim, EED could potentially move beyond the gendered lens
of the “reasonable person” used in the common law heat-of-passion defense (Miller, 2010). Yet EED, like its forebearer
provocation, has been subject to searing critique by feminist scholars for its deeply gendered perspective and toleration
of violence against women (Nourse, 1997; Ramsey, 2010; Dressler 2001). Indeed, Nourse's study of EED cases involving
intimate homicide from 1980 to 1995 found that EED reform permitted manslaughter instructions “in cases where the
defendant claims passion because the victim left, moved the furniture out, planned a divorce, or sought a protective
order” without evidence of infidelity—claims that were rejected at common law (Nourse, 1997, pp. 1332-33, 1349). A
2002 study of the 28 cases where EED was used in New York County from 1988 to 97, however, found that—while the
EED defense permits a jury to weigh mitigation in these circumstances—EED cases where the victim was a former wife or
girlfriend are unlikely to result in a manslaughter verdict (Kirschner et al., 2004). It is also possible that the EED defense,
in eliminating the cooling time requirement, better protects victims of domestic violence who kill their aggressors than the
heat-of-passion defense (Horder, 2005; Kirschner et al., 2004, p. 129).

2

As with provocation, scholars have wrestled with the legitimacy of EED as a partial excuse. For instance, Buchhandler-Raphael (2020) argues that loss of self-control is a flawed concept hinging on the “same problematic theory that underlies the
insanity defense's volitional impairment test” (p. 1843). Namely, in both doctrines, there is a lack of “psychological or
psychiatric basis for accurately demarcating the line between genuine impairment in capacity to exercise control and
simple failure to do so” (p. 1943). Morse (2009) and Bonnie (1983) have raised additional criticisms about control-based
tests. On the other hand, scholars have pointed to the unique attributes of the EED defense to distinguish it as a distinct,
legitimate defense despite the similar use of the loss of self-control notion (Dressler 1988; Weber, 1981). Ultimately,
however, the purpose of this paper is not to resolve those difficult disputes nor defend the existence of the EED defense.
Rather, this article seeks to explore the current doctrinal manifestations of the mitigating defense and provide guidance
to forensic mental health professionals on how to navigate the complex waters of the doctrine.

3

Arkansas (Manslaughter, 2020a), Connecticut (Murder, 2020), Delaware (Extreme Emotional Distress, 2020), Hawaii
(Manslaughter, 2020b), Kentucky (Manslaughter in the First Degree, 2020; Murder, 2020), Montana (Mitigated Deliberate Homicide, 2019), New Hampshire (Manslaughter, 2020c), New York (Murder in the Second Degree, 2019), North
Dakota (Murder, 2020), Oregon (Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 2020), Utah (Special mitigation for mental illness or
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751

provocation reducing the level of criminal homicide offense [SMMI], 2020). Two American territories—Guam and American Samoa—also have adopted EED provisions (Guam (Manslaughter Defined and Classified, 2018), American Samoa
(Manslaughter, 1987).
4

The U.S. Constitution permits states to place the burden of establishing the elements of an EED partial defense on
defendants (Patterson v. New York, 1977; contra Mullaney v. Wilbur, 1975).

5

The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Seguritan (1998) excised the “extremely” modifier of “unusual and overwhelming
stress,” finding that Hawaii's EED statute focused on the defendant's reaction to the stress rather than the degree of its
unusual and overwhelming nature (p. 129).

6

Consider State v. Miller (1998) where the Montana Supreme Court found that evidence of prior nonviolent arguments
between the victim and the defendant indicated the defendant was under EED due to the abnormality of his violent eruption (p. 727).

7

For a more detailed exploration of contemporary differences among states' EED standards, particularly the extent to which
they resemble the common law HOP defense and permit consideration of mental disorder, see Johnston & Leahey (in
press).

8

These states include Utah, New Hampshire, and Arkansas.

9

However, some EED jurisdictions may follow the common law in treating as adequate provocation threats of
violence and/or informational words informing of conduct that, if seen, would constitute adequate provocation (MPC
Commentaries, pp. 57–58).

10

Though not without some controversy. See Singer (1986) and Kahan and Nussbaum (1996) for criticism of the frequency
of psychiatric evidence in EED cases.

11

In People v. Sepe (2013), mental disorder contributed to both prongs of the EED standard. There, the New York appellate
court held a jury verdict rejecting the defendant's EED verdict was against the weight of the evidence and emphasized—in
its assessment of both prongs of the defense—the defendant's “significant mental trauma,” “lengthy psychiatric history”
of treatment for depression and anxiety, deteriorating mental state in the months preceding the homicide, and “seriously
weakened psychiatric state” at the moment of the killing (pp. 284–285).

12

One state, Connecticut, permits mental disorder to support an EED defense but requires a defendant to establish their
disturbance did not stem from a mental condition equating to insanity. Judges have complained that this element is
misleading, confusing, and distracting for the jury (Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions, 2020; Blue, 1990).

13

For a discussion of how forensic psychiatrists should assess the loss of self-control in Hawaii, see Hall et al. (2001).

14

Some may question whether the mental health condition in question should be a defined, structured disorder as codified
in the DSM-5, or whether syndrome evidence or that of “conditions for further study” may be admissible in EED cases.
Though a review of the merit of DSM-5 classifications over other methods of identifying mental disorder is beyond the
scope of the current paper, we uphold that despite its limitations (see Pickersgill, 2014, for example). The DSM-5 is
widely considered authoritative given its use of review groups consisting of hundreds of international experts, decades of
peer-reviewed research, and consideration of multicultural differences. Although the evidence for its reliability is mixed
(e.g., Chmielewski et al., 2015) it has demonstrated incremental validity over prior DSM editions (Stinchfield et al., 2016).
Ultimately, the admissibility of testimony regarding mental disorder, whether or not the DSM-5 is used, is an issue for the
finder of fact.
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